In the complex realm of Sahel politics, encompassing the semi-arid expanse spanning from Senegal in the west to Eritrea in the east, the year has been marked by heightened tension and suspense. In late July, President Mohamed Bazoum of Niger found himself in the grip of a precarious situation when members of his presidential guard apprehended him.
General Abdourahamane Tchiani, who had been leading the presidential guard since 2011, assumed the presidency of the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland just two days after the event. This marked Niger’s fifth coup d’état since gaining independence from France in 1960.
Since 1950, Africa has experienced a total of 220 coup attempts, with almost precisely half, 109 of them, resulting in success. A noticeable pattern has begun to surface, warranting our attention: in 2021, the governments of Guinea, Mali, and Sudan were overthrown, and in January of the following year, Burkina Faso witnessed a coup, only for the interim president to be removed in September. The ousting of President Ali Bongo in Gabon in August prompted the Financial Times to run a headline, “Déjà coup.”
These coups have swept through Françafrique, which encompasses France’s sphere of influence among its former colonies in Central and West Africa. More extensively than other European nations that withdrew from colonial territories, France has upheld strong political, economic, and military connections with its former colonies, often positioning itself as a stabilizing force. Between 1960 and the mid-1990s, France engaged in military interventions within its client community approximately once a year on average.
Due to challenging budgetary constraints, the French armed forces are having to scale back their operations. In 2012, President François Hollande humorously declared in Dakar that “the time of Françafrique is over,” reflecting the shift in domestic public sentiment.
The recent surge of coups may further accelerate this process; President Emmanuel Macron has announced the withdrawal of France’s ambassador from Niger, and 1,500 French military personnel will depart by year’s end. Macron had already withdrawn 5,000 troops from Mali last summer and 400 special forces from Burkina Faso this February, with the recent expulsion of the French defense attaché in that country.
It might seem like a long-overdue acknowledgment of post-colonial reality, but France’s recent actions demonstrate that it recognizes former colonial territories as equal members of the global community, right? Not entirely. France’s involvement in the Sahel region hasn’t been driven solely by a desire to relive imperial glories.
Between 2012 and 2014, 4,000 French soldiers launched Operation Serval to expel Islamic militants from northern Mali. Its successor, Operation Barkhane, involved 3,000 troops stationed in Chad (with minor contributions from Estonia and Sweden, along with logistical support from the UK) to combat Islamists throughout the Sahel and foster stability while eliminating extremist forces.
The coup that occurred in Mali in 2021 initially led Macron to transfer French forces to Niger, which he described as a mere refocusing effort. However, in November of the same year, he declared the termination of Operation Barkhane, aligning this decision with the shifting priorities outlined in his National Strategic Review, which was published simultaneously.
But this is not just an issue for the French armed forces.
The United States Africa Command, headquartered in Stuttgart and bolstered by a hub at Camp Lemonnier near Djibouti, holds responsibility for all of Africa, excluding Egypt. In his annual Posture Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March, Gen. Michael Langley, the commander, conveyed key insights and priorities.
The Wagner factor
Africa, Langley explained, “set the stage for violent extremist organizations to grow, and for America’s strategic competitors to bid for international allies.”
He continued: “Africa is now the epicenter of international terrorism. Russia is expanding its African operations, including via the Kremlin-supported private military company Wagner; destabilization, democratic backsliding, and human rights abuses follow in their wake.”
A French withdrawal would create a substantial strategic void. While there is growing focus on the threat posed by Russia, it doesn’t imply that the US can disregard the issue of Islamic terrorism. The ongoing increase in violence underscores the fact that “ungoverned spaces” provide fertile ground for the growth, enhancement, and development of militant groups.
The situation is even more concerning. Since 2017, the Wagner Group, a private military contractor established by Yevgeny Prigozhin, has dispatched approximately 5,000 troops to various locations in Africa.
This diverse assembly of Russian ex-soldiers, convicts, and foreign individuals, now financed directly by Russia following Prigozhin’s passing earlier this summer, has been involved in the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, and Sudan. They’ve offered security, paramilitary support, and disinformation services. Remarkably, they have frequently received resource concessions as a form of compensation.
Connecting the dots reveals a clear picture. If France reduces its presence in the Sahel, the United States lacks the current capacity to fill the void with ground forces. Nations like Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger will naturally seek new allies to safeguard their internal stability and order against jihadi forces.
If that ally happens to be the Wagner Group—an adaptable, ethically unbound, ruthless, and deniable proxy for Putin—it would result in an expansion of Russian global influence and the empowerment of an irregular, unpredictable, and unscrupulous force.
When President Bush established AFRICOM in 2007, it was often described as a “combatant command plus.” This meant that it fulfilled the same role as other unified combatant commands, but with an added emphasis on diplomacy and the projection of soft power.
In reality, it’s more of a “minus” situation; those supplementary responsibilities are at the heart of Gen. Langley’s mission. While it maintains a limited direct presence of 2,000 personnel, primarily in Stuttgart, it holds substantial potential for training, development, and assistance. Its various components are highly adaptable, with the U.S. Army component (Southern European Task Force, Africa) capable of operating anywhere from a platoon size to a two-star joint task force headquarters.
US policymakers and legislators know the Sahel is important for the security of Africa and beyond. But the pace of events is accelerating, and we are now in a position where failing to make a decision is by default a choice, as the geopolitical situation will not wait.
The White House must establish the fundamental tenets of its policy regarding Françafrique. Is it ready to permit a substantial increase in Russian influence? If not, what measures is it willing to take to impede such a development? I anticipate that by the start of the New Year, the cost of remaining engaged will likely have escalated. Therefore, the question is: are you committed to participation, or are you opting out?