While recent reports have highlighted a growing rift between Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and U.S. President Trump, such narratives may be part of a broader misdirection. The political dynamics between the two have been exaggerated to distract from the reality: Israel is set to fire the opening shots of this possible war.
Behind the scenes, Trump has reportedly received tacit approval from Gulf leaders, positioning the U.S. as an implicit ally. Israel, however, will act as the catalyst, launching the first wave of strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. The U.S. will play a supportive role, stepping in after Israel’s actions and assuming the “good cop” role, while Israel, as the aggressor, will take the “bad cop” position in the eyes of the international community. This strategic division allows the U.S. to maintain its diplomatic standing in the region while Israel secures its long-term security objectives.
In recent months Israel has increasingly signaled preparation for a unilateral strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. U.S. intelligence reports (leaked to the press) indicate that Israeli military communications and exercises suggest imminent planning. Israeli leaders, from Prime Minister Netanyahu to Defense Minister Katz, have publicly warned that Iran is now “more exposed than ever to strikes on its nuclear facilities”.
In this forecast we assume Israel initiates the operation (with U.S. forces in a supporting role). The strike would begin with coordinated air attacks and cyber/special-forces actions designed to blind Iran’s defenses and demolish its nuclear program before Tehran can mobilize.
Israel’s experience (e.g. Syria 2007, Natanz sabotage) has prepared it for such missions; here we outline the likely targets and sequence from a military vantage point. (Readers should note that in this scenario Iran’s leadership does not see the attack coming, and the strike is treated as preemptive defense.)
Known Targets
Iran’s nuclear program is spread across several hardened sites. Natanz (Qom province) is the primary enrichment complex, with two large halls (a vast underground Fuel Enrichment Plant and an above-ground pilot plant) housing about 16,000 centrifuges. The Natanz FEP is roughly three floors below ground, making it exceptionally hard to destroy by conventional bombing.
Nonetheless, Israeli analysts would focus maximum firepower on Natanz’s two key halls to crater the cascades. West of Tehran lies Fordow, a deep-underground site built into a mountain near Qom. Fordow hosts ~2,000 advanced centrifuges (dozens enriching toward 60% uranium. Its 80–90 m rock overburden makes it Iran’s best-fortified nuclear bunker, so Israel would likely prepare specialized bunker-busters or even discuss MOAB-type ordinance to collapse it.
Also targeted would be Iran’s fuel-cycle and research centers. In Isfahan there is a major nuclear technology park on the outskirts of the city. The Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) and Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Isfahan turn mined ore into gas for enrichment. The complex also contains equipment to make uranium metal (a bomb core ingredient) and reportedly hosts centrifuge-part productionr.
Israel would aim strikes at the UCF building and related workshops to deny Iran fresh feedstock for its centrifuges. Farther west at Arak (now often called Khondab), Iran built a heavy-water reactor and plant – under the 2015 JCPOA its core was dismantled and filled with concrete to prevent bomb-grade plutonium production. Both the unfinished Arak reactor and the adjacent heavy-water production facility would be prime targets, to eliminate any future plutonium-production path. (Under JCPOA Iran agreed to suspend Arak, but has since announced plans to restart it by 2026.)
Tehran and Other Sensitive Sites
Other Iranian nuclear sites (not shown on the map) would be struck in tandem. South of Tehran is the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC), which includes multiple laboratories (e.g. Jabr Ibn Hayan Labs, radiochemistry) where Iran admitted conducting plutonium separation, uranium conversion and even laser enrichment. This military-grade R&D center – plus its adjacent 5 MW research reactor (TRR) – would be hit to cripple any covert plutonium or HEU effort. The TRR, built in the 1960s to use highly enriched fuel, remains dual-use. Iran is likely to consider it a survivable outpost, but Israel would almost certainly bomb the TNRC and nearby TRR building.
Also in range are sites outside official IAEA declarations. Iran’s first uranium mine at Saghand (near Yazd) is included, since striking the mine and mill would interrupt fuel supply In addition, Israel would target facilities linked to weapons work rather than energy. The Parchin military complex east of Tehran – long suspected of hosting nuclear warhead high-explosive tests – would be on any list (satellite imagery and archives show special chambers there).
Similarly, the 2018 Mossad-seized “Nuclear Archive” identified several clandestine sites (Lavizan-Shian, Marivan, Turquzabad, etc.) associated with Iran’s old Amad bomb project. While Iran insists these are civilian, Israel has already struck near Tehran (e.g. November 2022 Karaj centrifuge factory). Intelligence reports also flag a suspected covert warhead workshop at Semnan (the so-called “Rainbow” site) where Iran may be building tritium-boosted detonators. If satellite data (such as mobile fuel tanks) confirm these, Israel would likely include Semnan in the strike package.
To protect its strike force, Israel would first suppress Iran’s air defenses. This means putting in crosshairs any known SAM batteries and radars. Notably, Iran has Russian S-300 batteries deployed around major sites like Fordow. Israel will likely expend anti-radiation missiles and possibly special munitions to blast those batteries. Recent analyses note that Iran’s mobile SAM sites (including any Pechora/S-200 or S-300 units) would be hunted.
At the same time, Israel would degrade Iran’s missile and rocket forces to prevent retaliation. Known IRGC ballistic missile bases – such as the Shahroud missile test range (north of Tehran) and the Imam Ali base in western Iran – would be struck with precision strikes. NTI and defense analysis list these as key Shahab/Sejil missile storage sites. Israel would also hit IRGC production factories in Tehran (for example the Fajr and Shahid Bakeri missile plants) and destroy depot stockpiles of ballistic and cruise missiles.
Command-and-control nodes would be targeted too: airstrikes or special forces would aim at the IRGC’s main command bunkers and C3 centers (around Tehran or under mountains) to sow confusion. In short, the first wave would include anti-aircraft suppression (SEAD), missile bases (to block Iran’s counter-strike), and leadership/C2 sites. Israeli helicopters or drones might even seize local radars. In parallel, Israel’s Navy or air arm could engage Iranian air bases (Hamadan, Isfahan, Tabriz) to keep Iranian F-14/F-4 interceptors grounded.
Israeli Strategy
Israel’s recent history provides clear precedents for this scenario. In 2007 its air force executed Operation Orchard, destroying a Syrian nuclear reactor at Al-Kibar in one night. This strike was a model for surprise strikes on nuclear sites. More covertly, the 2010 Stuxnet cyber-attack (attributed to Israel and the U.S.) physically destroyed Iranian centrifuges at Natanz by stealth, showing Israel’s use of non-kinetic means to delay Iran. In the 2010s and ’20s Israel carried out dozens of operations in Syria against IRGC/Hezbollah targets, demonstrating its ability to strike far beyond its borders without escalation.
Closer to home, Iran’s own reports document repeated “accidents” inside Natanz – for example a blast in July 2020 demolished Natanz’s new centrifuge hall, and an April 2021 power blackout followed new centrifuge tests. Iran immediately blamed Israel in each case. Likewise, an Iranian report in 2022 described a sabotage at the Karaj centrifuge component plant. Even public Israeli messaging signals intent: Defense Minister Katz has said Israel “won’t allow Iran to get a nuclear bomb” and has boasted of ongoing covert campaigns. In short, Tel Aviv has long refined a playbook – combining cyberattacks, commando raids, targeted killings and air strikes – that it would employ against Iran’s program.
Although Israel would lead the operation, the United States is expected to play a supporting role in the opening days. Analysts note that hits on heavily-fortified sites like Natanz would likely require U.S. assistance with mid-air refueling and extra munitions. We thus expect U.S. Navy carriers and Air Force bombers to converge in the region immediately after Israel strikes. U.S. Air Force assets might launch parallel strikes: for instance, B-52s or F-15E’s could hit Iranian missile brigades, radar installations, or IRGC outposts in eastern Iraq/Syria, complementing Israeli strikes.
Washington’s role would focus on force-multipliers – tankers, satellite reconnaissance, AGM-158 cruise missiles or stealth bombs – while allowing Israel to choose and attack the core targets. U.S. special-operations (e.g. SEALs) could secure staging areas or seize small but critical facilities. Throughout the first 48–72 hours, Israeli and U.S. operations would proceed in parallel but under close coordination. After that, Israel would press on alone. In past crises (e.g. Desert Storm, Syria strikes) U.S.-Israel coordination has taken a similar shape: the U.S. provides the “outer envelope” of firepower and logistic support, with Israel executing the main mission.
An Israeli-initiated strike on Iran’s nuclear sites would thus begin with a massive, integrated assault on both technical and military targets. Israeli jets (primarily F-35I and F-15Is) – likely refueled by U.S. tankers – would pound Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan and Arak with penetrating bombs. Cruise and ballistic missiles (potentially launched from Israeli subs or ships) would hit hardened bunkers.
Simultaneously, aircraft and drones would suppress Iranian SAM batteries and radars (with the February 2025 model of anti-radiation missiles), clearing a flight path. By nightfall, many key nuclear facilities could be wrecked or inoperable. In the following days, mopping-up strikes would target any remaining enrichment cells or research labs uncovered by initial blasts. Throughout, Israel would threaten retaliation for any Iranian counter-attacks (on Israeli territory or shipping), relying on U.S. support to deter large-scale escalation.