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In 2021, as a satellite passed over the Niger Delta, it captured images of vast swathes of barren land. The site, located outside Port Harcourt, was part of a cleanup project listed by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), aimed at restoring the area to its former state as green farmland. This was supposed to reverse the damage caused by decades of oil spills, which had transformed the Delta into a symbol of environmental degradation. However, instead of being rejuvenated, the land had become a desolate “moonscape,” deemed unusable for agriculture, according to U.N. documents. It wasn’t an isolated failure. A series of newly uncovered investigations, emails, letters to Nigerian ministers, and meeting minutes reveal a pattern of mismanagement and poor execution. Senior U.N. officials described the Nigerian cleanup agency, the Hydrocarbon Pollution Remediation Project (HYPREP), as a “total failure.” The agency’s selection of cleanup contractors came under heavy criticism in a U.N. review, which found that many of the firms hired lacked relevant expertise. The cleanup effort was further marred by shoddy practices: soil samples were sent to laboratories that lacked the necessary equipment to conduct the required tests, and auditors were physically obstructed from verifying whether work had actually been completed. The cleanup companies were often linked to powerful Nigerian politicians, a former Nigerian environment minister told the AP. U.N. officials shared similar concerns, pointing to the cozy relationship between political elites and contractors, which contributed to the project’s failures. The situation was supposed to be different. The Niger Delta has experienced thousands of oil spills since oil production began in the 1950s. Studies and reports have shown that local communities often use contaminated water for drinking, washing, and cooking, exacerbating health and environmental problems. Despite a 2011 U.N. survey that highlighted the severity of the pollution, spills continue to occur regularly. In November 2023, for example, the Ogboinbiri community in Bayelsa State suffered its fourth spill in just three months, devastating fields, streams, and fisheries. “We haven’t harvested anything,” said farmer Timipre Bridget. “There’s no way to survive.” Following the 2011 survey, oil companies, including Shell—the country’s largest private oil and gas firm—agreed to contribute $1 billion toward cleaning up the worst-affected area, Ogoniland. The U.N. was relegated to an advisory role, while the Nigerian government took charge of managing the funds. But an internal investigation by U.N. scientists last year revealed that cleanup efforts outside Port Harcourt had been abysmal. The site was left without topsoil, with nearly seven times the petroleum contamination allowed by Nigerian health standards. The company responsible for the cleanup had its contract terminated, according to Nenibarini Zabbey, the current director of HYPREP. However, Philip Shekwolo, who was in charge when the contract was awarded, rejected the allegations. He dismissed the U.N. documents as “baseless” and “cheap blackmail,” insisting that the cleanup had been a success. Yet U.N. officials had raised concerns about the process as early as 2021, when Shekwolo was acting chief of HYPREP. A U.N. review in January 2022 found that 21 out of 41 contractors approved for cleanup work had no relevant experience. Some of these companies were simply construction firms or general merchants, according to meeting minutes. U.N. Senior Project Advisor Iyenemi Kakulu described the situation as effectively handing contractors a “blank check,” while Hyprep’s own communications chief, Joseph Kpobari, acknowledged that incompetent firms were responsible for the poor cleanups. Yet, these same firms were awarded contracts for more polluted sites, according to U.N. documents. Zabbey defended HYPREP’s record, claiming that 16 out of 20 sites in the first stage of the project had been certified as clean by Nigerian regulators. He also insisted that the agency followed proper procedures when issuing contracts. However, two anonymous sources familiar with the cleanup efforts told the AP that when officials visited laboratories used by HYPREP, they found that these labs lacked the necessary equipment to perform the required tests. In a letter to its customers, a U.K. laboratory that frequently worked with HYPREP admitted that many of its tests in 2022 were flawed and unreliable. The U.K. laboratory accreditation service even confirmed that the lab had been suspended twice during that period. Zabbey, however, claimed that HYPREP now closely monitors contractors, ensuring that laboratories adhere to Nigerian and U.N. standards and are regularly inspected. In 2021, the U.N. raised further alarms about HYPREP’s financial management, warning that the agency’s spending was not being tracked. Internal auditors faced strong resistance and were “demonized for doing their job,” according to the U.N.’s assessment. HYPREP’s previous leadership had actively obstructed audits, even physically preventing auditors from verifying whether work had been completed. Zabbey responded by claiming that the audit team is now valued, and financial accounts are audited annually. However, he only provided one audit cover letter, which acknowledged “weaknesses” in HYPREP’s financial management. One Nigerian politician, Sharon Ikeazor, attempted to bring about change. A lawyer by training, Ikeazor served as environment minister in 2019 and quickly recognized the depth of the problem. “The companies had no competence whatsoever,” she said in a phone interview. In February 2022, she received a letter from senior U.N. official Muralee Thummarukudy, warning of “significant opportunities for malpractice” in the contract awarding process. This was unusually strong language in U.N. diplomatic circles. Ikeazor removed Shekwolo from his position as acting HYPREP chief the following month, citing concerns that he was too closely tied to political interests. Shekwolo’s connections to politicians, many of whom owned cleanup companies, were well known, Ikeazor said. She explained that the few competent firms in the sector were excluded from major contracts, while the politically connected companies dominated. Shekwolo’s former employer, Shell, and the U.N. had both warned her about his involvement in the cleanup effort. Ikeazor’s decision to review and investigate the contracts sent “shockwaves” through Nigeria’s political class. She was quickly removed from office, with Shekwolo reinstated just two months later. Shekwolo denied any undue political influence in his work, insisting that his removal had no explanation and was merely a result of personal dislike from Ikeazor. In 2023, the U.N. officially ended its involvement in the Nigerian oil spill cleanup, citing the completion of its five-year consultancy agreement. However, Ikeazor and two other sources familiar with the project believe that the real reason for the U.N.’s exit was frustration over rampant corruption. Zabbey contended that the U.N.’s departure was simply a matter of the organization shifting its focus and moving on from the project.